

Martin Hagen

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CONTACT

Address: Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros (CUNEF),
Calle de Leonardo Prieto Castro, 2, 28040 Madrid, Spain.

Email: martin.hagen[at]cunef.edu

Website: <https://sites.google.com/view/mhagen>

POSITION

Assistant Professor of Economics (tenure track), CUNEF, since 2020.

EDUCATION

PhD Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2020.

MSc Economic Analysis, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2016.

BA Socio-economics, FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany, 2014.

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Matching; Migration Policy.

PUBLICATIONS & WORKING PAPERS

Collusion-proof and Fair Auctions. *Economics Letters*, 2019, Vol. 185, Art. 108682.

Abstract: In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).

Multidimensional Bargaining and Posted Prices (with Ángel Hernando-Veciana; April 2020; revised & resubmitted to *Journal of Economic Theory*).

Abstract: A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch condition. We provide a unified proof of both findings via the property of non-bossiness.

Collusion-proof Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Procurement (May 2020).

Abstract: A principal wants to procure a discrete number of homogeneous units from a finite set of agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that are strategy-proof and robust to collusion. The latter is captured by reallocation-proofness (group strategy-proofness) if the colluding agents can (cannot) make side deals among each other. We show that in every reallocation-proof mechanism, the

principal offers the agents a fixed price per unit. While group-strategy-proof mechanisms can be more complex, they cannot guarantee that the principal will receive exactly her desired quantity. We fully characterize the set of group-strategy-proof mechanisms with a uniform price.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Refugee Relocation: A Mechanism Design Approach.

Abstract: Refugee relocation in the European Union revolves around quota mechanisms. Quota mechanisms have been facing severe opposition because they are based exclusively on exogenous criteria and do not take Member States' preferences into account. We propose a novel mechanism that incorporates preferences and respects quotas.

Screening Migrants Optimally.

Abstract: We study the optimal design of refugee status determination procedures; that is, how to best distinguish refugees from economic migrants. We propose a new asylum system that gives migrants a choice between applying for asylum and participating in a "visa lottery". In a simple model of mechanism design with costly verification, we show that this mechanism is optimal for the government.

PRESENTATIONS

2020: ZEW Mannheim, U Bonn, LUISS, CUNEF, U Barcelona.

2019: UC3M, ENTER Jamboree (Tilburg), Conference on Economic Design (Budapest), U Autònoma de Barcelona, Symposium of the Spanish Economic Association (Alicante).

2018: UC3M, Toulouse SE.

TEACHING & WORK EXPERIENCE

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| Teaching Assistant , Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. | Grade |
| — Game Theory, PhD, Prof. Antoine Loeper, Spring 2018–2020. | 5/5 |
| — Microeconomics, BSc, Prof. Diego Moreno, Spring 2018. | 4.45/5 |
| — Quantitative Microeconomics, BSc, Prof. Iliana Reggio, Fall 2017. | 4.47/5 |
| — Econometrics, BSc, Prof. Miguel Delgado, Spring 2017. | 4.18/5 |
| — Applied Microeconomics, BSc, Prof. Julio Cáceres, Spring 2016. | 4.85/5 |
| — Environmental Economics, BSc, Prof. José Luis Oviedo, Fall 2015. | 4.83/5 |

Teaching Assistant, FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg.

— Statistics, BA, Prof. Ingo Klein, Fall 2012 – Spring 2013.

— Introduction to Economics, BA, Prof. Regina Riphahn, Spring 2011 – Fall 2012.

Research Assistant, Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany. Department of International Comparisons and European Integration, Prof. Herbert Brücker, 10/2012 –12/2013.

SCHOLARSHIPS & AWARDS

Nada-es-Gratis Award for Job Market Papers in Economics, 2019.

Vice-Dean's Commendation Letter for Teaching Excellence, UC3M, 2015–2020.

Doctoral Scholarship, Spanish Ministry of Economy, 2017–present.

Extraordinary Prize for Best Student in MSc Economic Analysis, UC3M, 2016.

Graduate Scholarship, UC3M, 2014–2016.

Max Weber Scholarship, State of Bavaria, Germany, 2010–2016.