Margarita Kirneva
Curriculum Vitæ

RESEARCH FIELD

Primary Field: Microeconomic Theory
Secondary Field: Game theory, Political economy, Social choice

EDUCATION

PhD in Economics   2019-
Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France
    Supervisors: Olivier Gossner, Matías Núñez

Visiting Predoctoral Fellow   Fall 2021
Northwestern University, Evanston, USA
    Sponsor: Bruno Strulovici

Master in Economics   2017-2019
University Paris-Saclay, Palaiseau, France
    Mention - Tres Bien (with highest honors)

Erasmus Student Exchange Program   Fall 2016
Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium

Bachelor of Economics   2013-2017
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

- Specialization: Mathematical Methods in Economics.

- Diploma with highest honor

JOB MARKET PAPER

"[Informing to Divert Attention](#)", 2023.

Abstract: I study a multidimensional Sender-Receiver game in which Receiver can acquire limited information after observing the Sender's signal. Depending on the parameters describing the conflict of interest between Sender and Receiver, I characterise optimal information disclosure and the

information acquired by Receiver as a response. I show that in the case of partial conflict of interests (aligned on some dimensions and misaligned on others) Sender uses the multidimensionality of the environment to divert Receiver's attention away from the dimensions of misalignment of interests. Moreover, there is negative value of information in the sense that Receiver would be better off if she could commit not to extract private information or to have access to information of lower quality. I present applications to informational lobbying and consumer's choice.

WORKING PAPERS

"Legitimacy of collective decisions: a mechanism design approach", 2023, *submitted* (with Matías Núñez).

Abstract: We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming recent impossibility results concerning the implementation of majority rule. The second one adds sequential ratification to the standard majority voting procedure allowing to reach the (correct) outcome in significantly fewer steps than the widely used roll call voting. Both mechanisms use off-equilibrium lotteries to incentivize truthful voting. We discuss different extensions, including the possibility for agents to abstain.

"Voting by simultaneous vetoes", 2021 (with Matías Núñez).

Abstract: We propose the first class of simultaneous voting mechanisms in which each Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof. These mechanisms hence prevent the coordination failures which arise when some (coalition of) voters could have induced an outcome that they all prefer to the equilibrium outcome had they agreed on a common strategy. In each of these mechanisms, some voter(s) has the right to veto a list of alternatives. For each specification of the veto rights, each of these mechanisms implements a Veto by random priority rule introduced by Moulin [1981]. We then discuss necessary conditions for arbitrary mechanisms to implement a Pareto efficient rule ensuring that each equilibrium is coalition-proof. We show that the presence of veto rights in the mechanism is unavoidable to achieve this demanding implementation notion.

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Multidimensional Bayesian Persuasion", 2022.

TEACHING

Crash course in Microeconomics   2023
Master of Science and Technology, Ecole Polytechnique
    Instructor

Microeconomics I   2022-2023
A2, ENSAE
    Tutor (prof. Philippe Choné)

Microeconomics II   2020-2023

M1 Master in Economics, Ecole Polytechnique
    Tutor (prof. Yukio Koriyama, Olivier Gossner)

Introduction to Economics   2019-2021
Engineering program, Ecole Polytechnique
    Tutor (prof. Olivier Gossner, Jean-Baptiste Michau)

Econometrics   2016-2017
Bachelor program, Higher School of Economics
    Teaching Assistant (prof. Boris Demeshev)

Probability Theory   2015-2016
Higher School of Economics
    Teaching Assistant (prof. Boris Demeshev)

SEMINARS & CONFERENCES

2023 - ADRES Doctoral days, Paris-Dauphine; University of Bonn; THEMA, Cergy University; HEC PhD workshop; Alpine Game Theory Symposium, Grenoble; COMSOC 2023, Ben-Gurion University; Stony Brook game theory festival; EEA-ESEM congress; Transatlantic Theory workshop; CREST Microeconomics seminar; University Paris-Saclay (*scheduled*); PSE TOM seminar (*scheduled*); IHP PhD Game Theory seminar (*scheduled*).

2022 - CREST Internal Microeconomics seminar; Econometric Society Summer School in Economic Theory, Singapore; University Paris-ASSAS.

2021 - CREST Political Economy working group; International Conference in Social Choice and Voting; 22nd ACM Conference on Economics & Computation; EEA-ESEM virtual congress; Transatlantic Theory workshop; Northwestern University Student Lunch seminar.

REFEREEING

International Journal of Game Theory

OTHER SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION

Seminars organization: Internal Microeconomics Seminar, CREST; Theory Reading group; CREST Polarization group

Management Science Reproducibility Project: a reveiwer

GRANTS AND SCOLARSHIPS

1-year PhD extention Scholarship, Labex ECODEC	2023-2024
1-year PhD extention Scholarship, Labex ECODEC	2022-2023
3-year full PhD Scholarship, Ecole Polytechnique	2019-2022
2-year Master Scholarship, University Paris-Saclay	2017-2019

WORK EXPERIENCE

Fondation du Risque
2018-2019

Paris, France

Research assistant. The research theme: Optimal subsidies for risky green projects in a dynamic context. Under supervision of Jean-Pierre Ponssard and Guy Meunier.

Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique
2018

Palaiseau, France

Research intern for the project: R&D subsidies for the energy transition supervised by Jean-Pierre Ponssard and Guy Meunier.

Ernst&Young
2017

Moscow, Russia

Intern in actuarial group.

LANGUAGES

Russian *(native)*, **English** *(fluent)*, **French** *(intermediate)*, **German** *(beginner)*