


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Education

- 2018–2023 **PhD, Economics & Management**, *University of Padua*, Padua.
Advisors: Dr. Orestis Troumpounis and Dr. Roberto Bonfatti
- 2017–2018 : **Master in Economic and Business Analysis**, *University of Malaga*, Malaga.
Advisor: Dr. Miguel Angel Jimenez Melendez
- 2012–2015 : **Degree in Finance and Accountancy**, *University of Malaga*, Malaga.
Advisor: Dr. Mario Federico Rueda Narvaez

Experience

- 02/2022– **Research Fellow and Lecturer**, *University of Malaga*, Spain.
Researcher in political economy, migration and public economics. I have also taught courses of Macroeconomics, Advanced Microeconomics, Behavioral Economics and Microeconomics.

Research

[Life pension and Parliamentary Effort, Job Market Paper](#)

Abstract.

Many democracies grant their parliamentarians access to an exclusive pension system. While there has been much debate about the financial cost of such schemes, little attention has been paid to their effect on parliamentary effort. We propose a model that captures the two main features of life pension schemes: i) the pension amount is increasing with seniority, and ii) age determines parliamentarians' eligibility. Our model highlights heterogeneous incentives to exert parliamentary effort: introducing a life pension decreases the effort of eligible parliamentarians with high accumulation levels and increases or maintains the effort of all other parliamentarians. We test this model using the introduction of the life pension in Italy in 1955 where the eligibility of parliamentarians depends on their age and the amount accumulated depends on their seniority. Our empirical results show that the prospects of accumulating a higher pension stimulates parliamentarians to exert more effort, especially when parliamentarians are not eligible. In contrast, eligible parliamentarians face a trade-off between accumulating further benefits or enjoying the life pension straight away. Senior eligible parliamentarians decrease their effort while all other parliamentarians maintain or increase their effort.

[The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption](#)

Abstract.

The performance of bureaucrats and politicians is a fundamental determinant of the quality of institutions. While much attention has been paid to the incentives of bureaucrats and politicians separately, little attention has been paid to the link between them. In this paper, we show that the expectation of government turnover shapes bureaucrats' behavior. Exploiting the introduction of a term limit in the 2013 municipal elections in Portugal, we use a difference in difference approach to compare bureaucratic corruption in municipalities with higher probability of government turnover (term-limited mayors) and municipalities with lower probability of government turnover (non term-limited mayors). We find a reduction of bureaucratic corruption in municipalities with higher probability of government turnover. The reduction of bureaucratic corruption exceeds 30 per cent across alternative corruption measures. The reduction of bureaucratic corruption is larger (smaller) in municipalities with a higher probability of the incumbent (challenger) being corrupt. The main mechanisms behind our empirical results are formalized in a theoretical model.

What are the main drivers of migration flows? (With Bernardo Moreno)

Abstract.

This paper proposes a theoretical model that jointly analyses the incentives that determine migration flows. The model considers the existence of two opposing forces embodied in incentives: i) the economic incentive and ii) the cultural incentive. In line with the literature analysing the impact of diversity on the economy, the economic incentive attracts migrants of the type under-represented in society by increasing diversity. In contrast, the cultural incentive attracts immigrants of the type overrepresented in society. We find that there is an equilibrium of migration flows dependent on the society's diversity, wage level and production level. We also analyse the effect on the equilibrium of implementing migration policies that promote immigration of a specific type, such as highly educated migrants.

Politicians commitment and electoral accountability: The case of municipal elections in Brazil

Abstract.

In this paper, we analyse the effect of electoral accountability on politicians' commitment. To address this question, we use the Brazilian municipal elections held in November 2020. We analyse the differences in the willingness to implement anti-COVID-19 measures and the duration of implementation between re-electable and non-reelectable mayors. Using a double hurdle model, we find that re-electable mayors are more likely to implement COVID-19 measures and for a longer length of time. This result shows that electoral accountability has a positive effect on politicians' commitment. Politicians consider the preferences of their potential voters by taking harsher measures. We also find that re-electable politicians apply the measures when the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths is lower.

Life pension and political selection

Work in progress.

Efficient allocation of bad neighbors in urban areas (With Socorro Puy)

Work in progress.

Presentations

- February 2023 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Seminar at Lahore University of Management Sciences.
- February 2023 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Seminar at University of Alicante.
- January 2023 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Seminar at Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (Budapest).
- December 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Symposium of the Spanish Economic Association. University of Valencia.
- November 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Spanish Network in Social Choice. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
- October 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Association of Southern European Economic Theorists. University of Crete.
- October 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
VI Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory. University of Malaga.
- October 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Workshop on Mechanism Design and Welfare Economics. University of Malaga.
- September 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
1st PaLau PhD Workshop in Economics. University of Padua.
- June 2022 ***The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption.***
Max Weber Programme Multidisciplinary Research Workshop. EUI Florence.

- June 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Association of Public Economic Theory. University of Marseille.
- March 2022 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- February 2022 ***The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption.***
Seminar at the University of Malaga.
- November 2021 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- November 2021 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Seminar at the University of Malaga
- July 2021 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Poster presentation, PhD Summer School on Applied Microeconomics.
- June 2021 ***The role of expectations of government turnover on bureaucratic corruption.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- April 2020 ***Life pension and Parliamentary Effort.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.
- April 2020 ***What are the economic consequences of regional nationalism? The case of Catalonia.***
Internal seminar at the University of Padua.

Teaching

- 2022-2023 ***Microeconomics (English).***
University of Malaga, MSc. in Economics.
- 2022-2023 ***Behavioral Economics (English).***
University of Malaga, BSc. in Economics.
- 2021-2022 ***Advanced Microeconomics (Spanish).***
University of Malaga, BSc. in Economics.
- 2021-2022 ***Macroeconomics (Spanish).***
University of Malaga, BSc. in Business Administration.

Visiting Appointments

- September 2021-
February 2022 ***University of Malaga.***
Under supervision of M. Socorro Puy Segura

Computer skills

- Programming Languages Python, R
- Database Stata, SQL, GIS
- Other programmms Latex, Microsoft Office

Languages

- Spanish: **Native.**
- English **Fluent.**
- Italian **Basic.**
- French **Basic.**

Membership

The Association for Public Economic Theory (APET), Spanish Economic Association (SAE) and Spanish Network in Social Choice.

Referees

Dr. Orestis Troumpounis

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